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Introduction 
According to an old university friend, Theresa May had once wanted to be Britain’s 
first female prime minister (Weaver, 2016). After David Cameron resigned as 
Conservative party leader and prime minister in the wake of the June 2016 Brexit 
referendum, she became Britain’s second. The premiership stands at the apex of the 
British political system and confers on its holder great prestige, a place in the history 
books and enormous potential influence (King, 1991). It is the job that most ambitious 
career politicians want (Riddell, 1993). In becoming prime minister, May achieved 
her lifelong ambition but her prize resembled a poisoned chalice. She was now 
responsible for leading a government committed to taking the country out of the 
European Union (EU).  
 
While the referendum’s outcome may have been advisory in a strictly legal sense, it 
was politically binding on the new prime minister. The 2015 Conservative manifesto 
had committed the party to respecting the result, the campaign had been fought in that 
spirit, and Cameron’s government, of which May had been part, had promptly 
accepted the decision. Despite having campaigned against leaving the EU, May was 
obliged to pursue this goal. Achieving it, however, would be fraught with difficulty. 
The paving legislation for the referendum had not explicitly authorised the 
government to give effect to the result, the vote in favour of leaving the EU had been 
won by narrow margin, and three-quarters of MPs had campaigned against Brexit 
(BBC News, 2016). To cap it all, no one was prepared for what came next, and there 
was little consensus in either May’s party or the country as to what should come next. 
The political and practical difficulties of delivering Brexit threatened to overwhelm 
the new prime minister. 
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This article examines May’s political inheritance and response to the Brexit vote. It 
focuses primarily on the period up to her fateful decision in April 2017 to call an early 
general election. No assessment of May’s response to the referendum would be 
complete without reference to the subsequent loss of her parliamentary majority and 
her return at the head of a minority government, but nor should it be distorted by these 
events. During her first nine months in office, she showed herself to be cautious but 
dogged in pursuit of delivering Brexit. She provided her government and party with a 
sense of direction in the chaotic wake of the referendum, and she succeeded in 
overcoming the initial challenge of giving effect to its result. It should also be 
remembered that her party’s share of the vote in 2017 increased by 5.5 percentage 
points on what Cameron had achieved in 2015. Had the vagaries of Britain’s voting 
system been kinder to the Conservatives, the course of events, and evaluations of her 
leadership, might have been very different. 
 
On this last point, expert surveys suggest that the most successful prime ministers are 
considered to be those who provide clear leadership at times of national emergency 
and/or set the political agenda for years to come (see Theakston, 2013). It also helps if 
prime ministers win elections (see Buller and James, 2012). Had the Tories won 
convincingly in June 2017, May could perhaps have joined the likes of Clement 
Attlee and Margaret Thatcher on the list of political ‘weather-makers’ (Hennessy, 
2000, p. 531) by leading Britain out of the EU on the terms she had defined. Instead, 
she now looks set to join the list of prime ministerial failures. At time of writing, it 
remains to be seen what fate has in store for the remainder of May’s premiership, 
including how long it will last, but it would be an enormous turnaround if she were 
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able to resurrect her long-term prospects in the wake of the election and her 
catastrophic loss of authority. 
 
A vacancy in Downing Street 
It was virtually impossible for David Cameron to continue as prime minister after 
nearly 52 percent of voters opted for Britain to leave the EU in the June 2016 
referendum. He announced his resignation within hours, asserting that ‘fresh 
leadership’ was required to implement the result (Keate et al., 2016). While Cameron 
would remain in office until the Tories elected a new leader, his announcement 
multiplied a post-referendum sense of uncertainty. No one seemed to be in control. 
 
The ensuing leadership contest was conducted according to rules introduced in 1998 
in William Hague’s Fresh Future reforms (see Quinn, 2012, pp. 97-130). Aspiring 
candidates would first need to be nominated by two Conservative MPs. Successful 
nominees would then participate in a series of eliminative parliamentary ballots, 
which would whittle the field down to two. Finally, these two candidates would face 
each other in a simple ballot of all Conservative party members. 
 
Befitting the unusual circumstances of the contest, there was a dramatic twist even 
before nominations closed. Boris Johnson, the ambitious former mayor of London and 
a high-profile Leave campaigner, was set to run but suddenly withdrew after Michael 
Gove, the justice secretary, fellow Leaver and Johnson’s own campaign manager, 
denounced him and announced his own candidacy. Facing a likely defeat, Johnson 
withdrew from the race. In the event, five candidates were nominated: Gove himself; 
Liam Fox, a former defence secretary and another Leave campaigner; Andrea 
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Leadsom, the energy minister and yet another Leave campaigner; Stephen Crabb, the 
work and pensions secretary and a supporter of remaining in the EU; and Theresa 
May, the home secretary and a seemingly lukewarm Remainer. 
 
The first round of voting among Tory MPs was held on 5 July. May established 
herself as the clear frontrunner, receiving just over half the votes cast (165 out of 
329). Leadsom (66 votes) was a distant second, ahead of Gove (48 votes) in third. Fox 
(16 votes) came last and was duly eliminated, while fourth-placed Crabb (34 votes) 
also withdrew (Elliott, 2016a). May, Leadsom and Gove then went through to a 
second round of voting among MPs on 7 July. May picked up nearly three-dozen 
votes, giving her the backing of more than 60 percent of the Conservative 
parliamentary party (199 out of 329 votes cast). Leadsom (84 votes) picked up some 
additional support, whereas Gove (46 votes) lost ground (Elliott, 2016b). Gove’s 
elimination from the contest meant that May and Leadsom would proceed to a ballot 
of all party members.  
 
Three factors help to explain May’s clear victory in the first stage of the contest. The 
first was basic parliamentary arithmetic. During the referendum campaign, 56 percent 
of Conservative MPs had supported remaining in the EU, and 42 percent had 
supported Brexit (BBC News, 2016). A large proportion of the former were almost 
certainly now disposed towards backing a Remainer. May had kept a low profile 
ahead of the referendum (see Oliver, 2016), but she had still come out against Brexit. 
A second factor was May’s success in presenting herself as the unity candidate. Her 
qualified support for EU membership and her immediate acceptance of the 
referendum result enabled her to win over some pro-Brexit MPs. More generally, May 
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sold herself as the representative of mainstream Conservatism. Her wider 
acceptability to all parts of the party was probably enhanced by her occasionally 
frosty relationship with Cameron and his ‘modernising’ allies (Laws, 2016, p. 274). 
Modernisation had been a central theme of Cameron’s party leadership (see Bale, 
2010). It had been both an agenda to make the party’s policies and image more 
appealing to contemporary society, and a discursive device for justifying change (see 
Dommett, 2015; Kerr and Hayton, 2015). But modernisation had been only tolerated 
at best by the party’s traditionalist base. Many were glad to move on. 
 
A final factor, especially important in the chaotic aftermath of the referendum, was 
May’s reputation as a ‘safe pair of hands’ (Coulson, 2016; Parker and Warrell, 2014). 
Much of this reputation stemmed from sheer longevity in office. She had been home 
secretary since 2010 and was the longest-serving holder of the post since James 
Chuter Ede in the 1945-51 Labour government. May’s style as home secretary had 
won her few friends, however. For the former Liberal Democrat minister David Laws 
(2016, p. 276), she was ‘instinctively secretive and very rigid’. For an unnamed 
Conservative, her team and working style were ‘very closed, very controlling, very 
untrusting’ (quoted in Day, 2014). For Kenneth Clarke, one of the former Tory 
ministers with whom she had clashed, May was a ‘bloody difficult woman’ (quoted in 
Savage, 2016). But if she was not much liked, she was respected. Compared to her 
rivals, May exuded experience and competence. 
 
Having made it through the parliamentary stage of the contest, May was now the clear 
favourite to win the ballot of Tory members, which was planned to take place later in 
the summer. A YouGov (2016a) survey of the party’s membership suggested that the 
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home secretary would beat Leadsom by 63 percent to 31 percent in a straight fight. 
Yet, there was one final twist in the leadership race. On 11 July, Leadsom suddenly 
announced her withdrawal from the contest following some ill-advised remarks about 
motherhood and the implication that she would make a better prime minister than the 
childless May (Sylvester, 2016). As the only candidate left, May was duly proclaimed 
the new party leader. On 13 July, she succeeded Cameron as prime minister. 
 
May’s challenges 
Theresa May was the seventh prime minister since 1945 to take office after becoming 
party leader during the lifetime of a parliament (see Worthy, 2016). Like others before 
her, she faced a steep learning curve. She immediately had to form a government, and 
she would soon be expected to answer prime minister’s questions in the House of 
Commons. She also had to escape the mindset of being a departmental minister: as 
head of government, she now had to see the bigger picture. Last but certainly not 
least, May now had to make good on her promise to deliver Brexit.  
 
In leading this process, May would need to grapple with a number of challenges. The 
first of these was simply to make the most of her limited capacity to influence people 
and events. Prime ministers have little executive power and few institutional resources 
of their own. They must rely largely on ministers and officials to develop and 
implement policy. They are constrained too by their cabinet colleagues and MPs, as 
well as by public opinion. To be sure, May enjoyed an array of powers that ensured 
her primacy within the government, not least the right to hire and fire ministers and 
control over the cabinet’s agenda and the rules of cabinet decision making (King, 
1991). She could also use her office as a ‘bully pulpit’ to communicate directly with 
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the public and other audiences (Heffernan, 2006). Yet her ability to access these 
resources would be contingent on her own ‘personal resources’, including her skills, 
her standing in the party, and her wider popularity and prestige (Heffernan, 2003).  
 
For the time being at least, May was in a fortuitous situation. The new prime minister 
may not have won a general election but she had convincingly won the leadership 
contest, and she faced no immediate threats from rivals. May benefited further from 
facing a demoralised and divided opposition. Indeed, a virtual civil war had broken 
out in the Labour party immediately after the June referendum. Already unhappy with 
the direction of Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership, three-quarters of Labour MPs now 
expressed their disapproval by supporting a motion of no-confidence in him as leader. 
Corbyn ignored the non-binding vote. Owen Smith, a Welsh MP, then mounted a 
formal leadership challenge against Corbyn. The contest dragged on until September, 
when Corbyn was re-elected with a resounding 62 percent of the vote (Rawnsley, 
2016). Labour’s strife paralysed the opposition and reinforced the Tories’ comfortable 
lead in the polls. It also gave the new prime minister some initial extra room for 
manoeuvre. 
 
A second and perhaps more fundamental challenge confronting May was more 
obviously political: to bring together her bitterly divided party. She inherited residual 
tensions between traditionalists and modernisers, or those who were socially 
conservative and socially liberal, and very pronounced tensions over Europe (see 
Heppell, 2013). For nearly three decades the Tories had been torn over Britain’s 
relationship with the EU. The referendum campaign had only exacerbated these 
divisions. Colleagues had taken different sides and questioned each other’s judgement 
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and integrity. Many of those who had opposed Brexit now felt a sense of resentment 
towards those who had campaigned for it. Looking ahead, May could expect dissent 
from Tory Leavers if there was any delay in implementing the result, and she could 
expect dissent from some Tory Remainers if doing so threatened Britain’s economic 
interests. On past form, the risk of dissent was always likely to be greater among pro-
Brexit Tories, whose opposition to the EU was almost an article of faith, than it was 
among anti-Brexit Conservatives, whose support for the EU was generally pragmatic 
and conditional (Lynch and Whitaker, 2013). Within weeks, pro-Brexit Tories had 
even formed a new campaign group, ‘Leave Means Leave’, which called for Britain to 
cut all ties with the EU as soon as possible (Ross, 2016).  
 
Compounding the second challenge was a third: May inherited a working majority of 
only 16.1 As a result, a dozen Tory MPs could hold her to ransom on any issue, 
including her plans for Brexit. Moreover, May would need to govern with this 
constraint potentially until 2020. As a consequence of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 
2011, the prime minister had lost the right to call an election at the time of her 
choosing (see Norton, 2016). Even if the electoral circumstances were favourable, 
there was no guarantee that May would be able to secure the two-thirds vote in the 
House of Commons needed to trigger an early election. 
 
A fourth challenge confronting May was to establish what leaving the EU would 
actually entail. The referendum had asked voters whether or not the United Kingdom 
should remain a member of the EU. It had not asked voters what kind of relationship 
with the EU they wanted if Britain left. While many people now wanted to retain 
access to the EU’s single market and membership of its customs union, there was 
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considerable disagreement over what Britain should concede in return. And there was 
little prospect of Britain enjoying such access or membership without making 
significant concessions to the EU (Wright and Coates, 2016). One position, soon 
dubbed ‘hard Brexit’, favoured complete control of national borders, laws and 
finances, even if this meant no free access to the single market and potentially falling 
back on World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules in future trade with the EU. The 
alternative position, termed ‘soft Brexit’, favoured compromise on these points in 
order to maximise access to the single market and the opportunity for free trade with 
the EU.  
 
There were arguably good economic reasons for pursuing a soft Brexit. Being outside 
of the single market threatened growth and the City of London’s pre-eminence in 
financial services. Leaked government papers suggested that a hard Brexit could cost 
the government £66 billion a year in tax revenues (Coates and Wright, 2016). But 
while economic logic pointed towards a soft Brexit, political realities pointed towards 
a harder version. The balance and relative intensity of opinion on the Conservative 
backbenches was one factor. So too was the mood among the Tory grassroots. A 
YouGov (2016a) survey of party members in July 2016 found that 57 percent said the 
new prime minister should try to negotiate a free-trade deal with the EU, but only if it 
could be done without allowing EU citizens the right to live and work in Britain. 
Meanwhile, there was little popular appetite for the concessions that might be needed 
to secure access to the single market. Controlling immigration had been a central 
promise of the Leave campaign, and survey data suggested that few voters were 
willing to compromise on this point (YouGov, 2016b). Any concessions would also 
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be pounced upon by the Tory press and especially those newspapers, such as The Sun, 
the Daily Mail and the Daily Express, which had campaigned for Brexit. 
 
A fifth challenge confronting May concerned the means by which Britain would 
actually leave the EU. Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty allowed for only two years of 
negotiations, but it was unclear if May’s government could trigger the process through 
the use of the royal prerogative, or if parliament would need to pass legislation. If 
legislative authorisation were needed, MPs opposed to Brexit could disrupt and delay 
the whole process, opening up further divisions on the government benches. The 
uncertainty stemmed from the fact that British membership of the EU was established 
in statute, specifically the European Communities Act 1972. It was also recognised in 
the various statutes that provided for devolution (Douglas-Scott, 2016). The European 
Referendum Act 2015, which had legislated for the referendum, had not explicitly 
authorised the government to trigger article 50. Even before the first round of voting 
in the Tory leadership contest, a number of groups had announced plans to submit a 
legal challenge to the high court on the grounds that explicit parliamentary approval 
was needed (Zeffman et al., 2016).  
 
The process of leaving the EU was further complicated by the fact that it would 
actually require a number of separate negotiations. The article 50 negotiations would 
cover the formality of withdrawal and matters such as the division of EU liabilities 
and assets—in effect, the ‘divorce bill’—the rights of EU citizens living in Britain and 
the status of the Northern Irish border (see The Economist, 2016). Britain would then 
need to negotiate a new trade deal with the EU, and it would also need to negotiate 
new free-trade agreements with the 53 countries that Britain presently enjoyed by 
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virtue of being in the EU. Furthermore, Britain would also need to negotiate the terms 
of its WTO membership, since these were presently defined by its status as an EU 
member. Since all these negotiations were likely to take longer than two years, it was 
likely that Britain would need to negotiate an interim relationship with the EU. 
Frustratingly, the other EU member states refused to enter into pre-negotiations. 
Worryingly, Whitehall lacked the capacity and expertise to plan for and conduct all 
these negotiations simultaneously (Rutter and McCrae, 2016). 
 
A sixth and rather more domestic challenge confronting the prime minister was to 
keep the country united as it left the EU. On the one hand, the referendum risked 
creating tensions between a pro-Brexit England and an anti-Brexit Scotland. Some 62 
percent of Scots had voted to remain inside the EU, and Scotland’s first minister 
Nicola Sturgeon immediately made it clear that a second independence referendum 
was now very much on the agenda (McIntosh and Macdonell, 2016). May’s 
government could well face a constitutional struggle to keep Scotland in one union as 
it looked to secure Britain’s withdrawal from another. On the other hand, leaving the 
EU would also have significant implications for Northern Ireland. Like their Scots 
counterparts, a majority of Northern Irish voters (56 percent) had supported remaining 
in the EU. More importantly, Northern Ireland shared a land border with the Republic 
of Ireland, an EU member state, and the openness of this border was a major 
component of the Northern Irish peace process. Brexit now potentially threatened that 
process. In negotiating withdrawal, the British government would somehow need to 




A final challenge facing May was to avoid being defined exclusively by Brexit. While 
leaving the EU would inevitably dominate politics for the remainder of the 
parliament, her government could not neglect other issues. Bread-and-butter concerns 
with the economy, public services and immigration would continue to structure 
domestic politics, and they were also likely to matter come the next general election. 
Voters would not judge the Conservatives solely on their handling of Brexit. May’s 
government would need some sort of policy vision or long-term programme if it were 
to set the broader terms of debate. After the referendum, the Conservatives’ mission 
could no longer be one of balancing the books and fixing Labour’s alleged past 
profligacy, the narrative developed by David Cameron and his chancellor of the 
exchequer, George Osborne (Gamble, 2015). As party leader, May would need to 
provide a new sense of purpose for her party. 
 
Leading in the referendum’s aftermath 
Theresa May had very little time to develop a strategy for managing the politics of 
Brexit and overcoming the challenges she faced. She had to hit the ground running. 
Her response began to take shape before she took office, and it became clearer over 
the following weeks and months.  
 
The first and perhaps most obvious feature of May’s response was her immediate and 
unambiguous acceptance of the referendum result. As she put it when announcing her 
candidacy for the Tory leadership: 
 
Brexit means Brexit. The campaign was fought, the vote was held, turnout was 
high, and the public gave their verdict. There must be no attempts to remain 
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inside the EU, no attempts to rejoin it through the back door, and no second 
referendum. (May, 2016a) 
 
‘Brexit means Brexit’ became the prime minister’s mantra. She repeated it on many 
subsequent occasions, including in her first speech at the October party conference: 
‘The referendum result was clear. It was legitimate … Brexit means Brexit’ (May, 
2016c). Like prime ministers before her, May used the bully pulpit of her office to 
articulate her intended direction of travel: Britain would be leaving the European 
Union. Her forceful tone served to provide some sense of certainty amidst the wider 
uncertainty generated by the referendum. It also served to reassure pro-Brexit MPs in 
her party, not to mention the 52 percent of voters who had opted to leave the EU. It 
did not, however, suggest any particular interest in reaching out to many of the 48 
percent who had voted to remain or to the 74 percent of MPs who had previously 
declared their opposition to Brexit (BBC News, 2016). 
 
A second feature of May’s response was to rule out emphatically an early election. 
When launching her leadership campaign, May had insisted that ‘there should be no 
general election until 2020’ (May, 2016a). She downplayed the prospect of going to 
the country at every subsequent opportunity, even as the Tories opened up a double-
digit polling lead over Labour in the spring of 2017 (Elliott et al., 2017). The line was 
unambiguous: an early election would create instability, and there was no need for 
one in any event. The prime minister might have felt constrained by the Fixed-term 
Parliaments Act; above all, she was probably mindful of the speculation that had 
damaged Gordon Brown’s reputation in 2007 (Allen, 2011, pp. 9-10). By allowing 
expectations to build and then not calling an early election, Brown had appeared 
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indecisive and weak. His premiership never fully recovered. May was not going to 
repeat that mistake. Downing Street’s line was always consistent and clear, and it 
successfully closed down destabilising speculation. When the prime minister changed 
her mind in April 2017, the surprise was complete. 
 
A third feature of May’s response was to delay as long as possible saying what form 
of Brexit she preferred and even when she would trigger article 50. If the prime 
minister was clear that Brexit meant Brexit, she was opaque on what Brexit would 
actually entail. When in early September David Davis, the new secretary for state for 
exiting the EU, suggested that Britain would probably leave the single market, the 
prime minister’s spokeswoman made it clear that he was expressing his ‘own 
opinion’, not government policy (Pickard and Warrell, 2016). A few days later, in a 
statement to MPs, May refused to reveal her hand ‘prematurely’ and further refused to 
‘provide a running commentary’. 
 
From May’s point of view, vagueness was necessary. Her government needed time to 
explore its options and prepare for the negotiations. Vagueness also enabled her to 
avoid an immediate public confrontation with one section or other of her own party. 
Once she declared her position, she was bound to antagonise either those who 
favoured a softer Brexit, or those who favoured a harder Brexit. From others’ points 
of view, however, vagueness added to the political and economic uncertainty. With 
demands for clarity mounting, May announced in October that article 50 would be 
triggered before the end of March 2017. She also hinted that her government was 
gearing up for a harder form of Brexit: ‘We are not leaving the European Union only 
to give up control of immigration again. And we are not leaving only to return to the 
 16 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice’ (May, 2016b). The tone was red meat 
for the Tory right. It was also perhaps part of a strategy to lower the expectations of 
those clamouring for a soft Brexit.  
 
Three months later, in a speech at Lancaster House in January 2017, the prime 
minister confirmed her intention of pursuing a harder Brexit. She ruled out continued 
membership of the single market and the contribution of ‘huge sums to the EU 
budget’. She also ruled out membership of the EU’s customs union: ‘I want Britain to 
be free to establish our own tariff schedules at the World Trade Organisation, 
meaning we can reach new trade agreements not just with the European Union but 
with old friends and new allies from outside Europe too’ (May, 2017). The opposition 
among Tory MPs who advocated a soft Brexit was surprisingly muted. 
 
A fourth feature of May’s response was to co-opt some of the Leavers in her party and 
oblige them to share the responsibility for delivering Brexit. Using her powers of 
appointment, May dismissed or demoted no fewer than thirteen cabinet-level 
ministers in a wide-ranging reshuffle, most notably George Osborne and Michael 
Gove, and promoted or brought in to cabinet several high-profile Leavers, including 
Boris Johnson, David Davis, Liam Fox, Andrea Leadsom and Priti Patel. Pro-Brexit 
ministers now constituted over a quarter of her senior ministerial team.2  
 
Even more important than numbers was May’s allocation of portfolios. She gave three 
key Brexit-related posts to prominent Leavers: Davis was made secretary of state for 
exiting the EU with responsibility for planning Britain’s withdrawal; Fox was made 
international trade secretary with responsibility for cultivating post-Brexit trade 
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agreements; and Johnson was made foreign secretary with responsibility for 
representing British interests more generally. The appointment of ‘the three 
Brexiteers’ provided further reassurance to the pro-Brexit wing of her party. It also 
bound them to the prime minister and obliged them to defend the government in any 
dealings with awkward Leave MPs. 
 
A fifth feature of May’s response was to assert the government’s ultimate control over 
the Brexit process. She would proceed not by consensus but by taking advantage of 
what remained of Britain’s traditional power-hoarding constitution (King, 2007). The 
most obvious manifestation of this approach was in the government’s initial plans to 
trigger article 50 on the basis of prerogative powers (Swinford, 2016). It would seek 
neither parliamentary authorisation nor the consent of the devolved institutions in 
Edinburgh, Belfast and Cardiff. In October at the Tory party conference, May (2016b) 
spelt out her stance: ‘the negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union are the responsibility of the Government and nobody else’. Parliament would, 
of course, have an opportunity to scrutinise the government’s actions, and the 
Scottish, Northern Irish and Welsh governments would be consulted. Parliament 
would also be asked to pass a ‘Great Repeal Bill’, which would repeal the European 
Communities Act 1972 and the primacy of EU law, and simultaneously transform all 
existing EU law into British law. Parliament would even be asked to vote on the final 
Brexit settlement. But no one would be allowed to dictate the government’s 
negotiating position. 
 
Political calculations drove this feature of May’s strategy. In essence, she needed to 
prevent MPs and peers and the devolved institutions from delaying or even vetoing 
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Brexit, since either outcome could antagonise the most ardent Brexiteers and threaten 
her government’s survival. The simplest way to do so was to use prerogative powers 
to trigger article 50. Once negotiations started, it would be virtually impossible for 
anyone to halt them. Opponents of Brexit would then be bound to accept whatever 
deal the government brought back, which meant in practice whatever the EU was 
willing to offer.  
 
The problem with this approach, however, was its potential illegality. A challenge had 
been presented to the high court in July, as noted, which argued that the government 
had no right to trigger article 50 through prerogative powers. The high court duly 
ruled against the government in early November, prompting a wave of hysterical 
headlines in some newspapers: the Daily Mail’s front page proclaimed the three 
judges to be the ‘enemies of the people’ (Slack, 2016). The government immediately 
appealed to the supreme court, which heard the case in December and issued its 
judgment in late January. By a majority of 8 to 3, the judges ruled that legislation was 
required to authorise the triggering of article 50 (Wright, 2017). The supreme court 
also ruled on the question of whether or not the consent of the devolved institutions 
was required. Much to ministers’ relief, it unanimously decided that it was not.  
 
The government, which had had plenty of time to prepare for the ruling, immediately 
published a short bill that authorised the prime minister to trigger article 50. MPs 
quickly passed the bill with surprisingly little fuss. The House of Lords then sought to 
amend it, with provisions to guarantee the rights of EU nationals living in the UK and 
to give parliament ‘a meaningful vote’ on the final Brexit deal—but peers ultimately 
backed down. The European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act received royal 
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assent on 16 March. Its passage had been virtually guaranteed by the Labour party’s 
decision to support it. Two weeks later, May formally notified the European Council 
of the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the EU. The whole episode 
ought to have been extremely embarrassing for the government. Instead, the political 
damage was limited. May’s insistence on appealing to the supreme court after the 
initial ruling, rather than rushing straight to parliament, had had the effect of 
signalling her intent and reinforcing her reputation for persistence. It also bought the 
government some time to prepare. 
 
A sixth feature of May’s response to the referendum was to assert her personal 
influence over the Brexit process within government. To do so, she utilised many of 
the powers traditionally associated with the premiership. When initially forming her 
government, for instance, she sacked a number of senior ministers with whom she had 
previously clashed, notably Osborne and Gove. It served as a powerful statement of 
intent. At the same time, May created additional Brexit-related portfolios, as seen, 
thereby making it harder for anyone else to ‘own’ the issue. She also reserved to 
herself the most important policy statements on Brexit and made occasional public 
interventions to rebuke or correct her ministers if they deviated from her line. Lastly, 
May used her powers to set the rules of collective decision making, in particular 
reorganising the cabinet-committee system and making herself the chair of four core 
policy committees, including a new Brexit committee. Early reports suggested a 
return to ‘traditional cabinet government’ (Thomson and Sylvester, 2016). But while 
there might have been more discussion among ministers, it was abundantly clear who 
was calling the shots. 
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May’s style of leadership was largely consistent with her conduct as home secretary. 
She demonstrated a characteristic stubbornness in pursuit of her goals, and a 
reluctance to be rushed into making decisions. She also demonstrated a characteristic 
disinterest in building coalitions. The way in which May dismissed Osborne and 
others in July 2016—and later her sacking of Tory grandee Lord Heseltine from a 
government advisory position after he voted to amend the then European Union 
(Notification of Withdrawal) Bill—revealed an almost vindictive streak. She seemed 
set on following Machiavelli’s dictum that it was ‘better to be feared than loved’ 
without heeding his advice to avoid ‘hatred’. The continuity in May’s operating style 
was further reinforced by the import into Downing Street of several long-serving 
advisers from her spell in the Home Office. She appointed Nick Timothy and Fiona 
Hill, two loyal former special advisers, as her co-chiefs of staff, and a number of other 
trusted personnel to other key positions (Warrell et al., 2017). The result was to create 
a tight-knit circle around the prime minister but one that potentially isolated her from 
other senior figures in the government and alternative sources of advice. 
 
A final feature of May’s response to the referendum was to make Brexit part of a new 
governing narrative, an account of what her government was doing and why. May had 
set out the narrative’s key themes at the start of her leadership bid: the referendum 
was a vote to regain control over laws and immigration, Britain would withdraw from 
the EU but continue to be a global player, and it was her ‘mission’ to create a more 
meritocratic society that worked for everyone, especially those who were ‘just about’ 
managing and not just the ‘privileged few’ (May, 2016a). Put another way, leaving 
the EU would be an opportunity for a national fresh start. 
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May promoted this narrative at every opportunity. Immediately after taking office, she 
again talked of her ‘mission to make Britain a country that works for everyone’ (May, 
2016b). In the first of two speeches at her party’s autumn party conference, she called 
the referendum ‘the biggest vote for change this country has ever known’, and set out 
a positive vision of an ‘independent, sovereign’ Britain (May, 2016c). In her second 
conference speech, she hailed this ‘once-in-a-generation chance to change the 
direction of our nation’, and promised a government that ‘steps up—and not back—to 
act on behalf of us all’ (May, 2016d). Three months later, when introducing her ‘plan 
for Britain’, the prime minister promised to ‘use this moment of change to build a 
stronger economy and a fairer society by embracing genuine economic and social 
reform’ (May, 2017). 
 
In some respects, May’s rhetoric was standard fare. All new prime ministers try to 
persuade voters that they stand for something new, all give hints of moving to the 
centre ground of British politics, and all promise to do more for ordinary working 
people. But in other respects, May’s narrative was remarkable. In making her own 
pitch to the centre ground, May sought to accommodate those voters who resented or 
felt ‘left behind’ by globalisation and the mainstream political parties (Ford and 
Goodwin, 2014). She did so by distancing herself from some of the prevailing 
orthodoxies of neoliberalism, as well as the party modernisation agenda associated 
with her predecessor. In an interventionist break with Cameron and recent 
Conservative party policy, she called for workers to be represented on company 
boards, for shareholder votes on executive pay to be binding, and for the country to 
develop a ‘proper industrial strategy’ (May, 2016a). This rhetorical enthusiasm for 
greater intervention certainly marked a departure from the party’s Thatcherite 
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commitment to the free market. So too did May’s decision to prioritise immigration 
controls over economic growth and access to the EU’s single market.  
 
The prime minister’s narrative was also remarkable, if only in the sense of meriting 
comment, because of the tension between its vision of a ‘global Britain’, underpinned 
by free trade, and its simultaneous and potentially conflicting commitment to ‘a better 
deal for ordinary working people at home’, underpinned by controlled immigration, 
greater state intervention and the reassertion of national sovereignty (May, 2017). The 
difficulties in squaring this circle were highlighted during May’s November 2016 trip 
to India, where British hopes of greater access for its financial services clashed with 
Indian hopes for relaxed immigration controls (Coates, 2016). They were also 
highlighted in the prime minister’s 2017 threat to set ‘competitive tax rates’ in a bid to 
‘attract the world’s best companies and biggest investors to Britain’ (May, 2017). It 
was not immediately clear how such a position would address the concerns of the ‘left 
behind’.  
 
Finally, May’s narrative was remarkable in being premised on a contested and 
contestable interpretation of the June referendum. Apparently disregarding the 48 
percent who rejected Brexit, she insisted that: ‘the message from the public before and 
during the referendum campaign was clear: Brexit must mean control of the number 
of people who come to Britain from Europe’ (May, 2017). Such an interpretation was 
not shared by everyone in her party, let alone the country. There were long-term risks 
in claiming a mandate to change the general direction of government policy on the 
basis of a narrow referendum result. 
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Throwing it all away?  
Theresa May’s first months in office were a critical period for the new prime minister. 
She came to power off the back of a referendum result that she had campaigned 
against, that no one had planned for, and that a majority of MPs and peers had 
opposed. Her response was to embrace Brexit and to make it her mission to deliver it. 
By the end of March 2016, May had at least cleared her first major hurdle. She had 
secured parliamentary authorisation to trigger article 50, and had then done so. May 
had also defined what form of Brexit the UK would pursue: it would be a harder 
Brexit, with Britain outside of the EU single market and customs union. Neither of 
these achievements was insignificant. 
 
Nevertheless, many challenges still lay ahead. Brexit negotiations had not started, and 
her party and the country remained divided over what form of Brexit the government 
should pursue. May’s parliamentary majority also remained wafer thin. Indeed, its 
precariousness had been reinforced by the resignation in late 2016 of two Tory MPs, 
Zac Goldsmith, who quit in protest at the government’s decision to proceed with the 
development of a third runway at Heathrow, and Stephen Phillips, who resigned over 
the government’s approach to Brexit (Keate, 2016). While the Conservatives had 
retained Phillips’ Sleaford and North Hykeham seat in the subsequent by-election, 
they had lost Goldsmith’s Richmond Park constituency to the Liberal Democrats. 
 
In April 2017, and reversing her earlier position, May suddenly announced her 
intention to seek an early election to be held on 8 June. The reasoning seemed 
impeccable. Her party had long enjoyed a comfortable lead over Labour in the 
opinion polls, and she enjoyed a considerable personal lead over Jeremy Corbyn 
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(YouGov, 2017). The Tories had even taken the Copeland constituency from Labour 
in a by-election in February 2017. Assuming the polls were accurate, May now looked 
certain to increase significantly her majority. This would strengthen her position vis-
à-vis both her parliamentary party and the EU. It would also give the prime minister a 
clear electoral mandate to pursue her vision of Brexit, not to mention extra time to 
achieve a deal before the next general election, now due in 2022. In terms of 
‘statecraft’, her decision seemed to be an act of strategic genius (Buller and James, 
2012). 
 
At first, everything went smoothly. The prime minister easily secured the 
parliamentary votes needed to hold an early election, and the Tories performed 
strongly in the local elections on 4 May. The Conservative campaign also had a 
seemingly clear focus: May’s reputedly ‘strong and stable leadership’ and ability to 
secure a good Brexit deal. But the Tories’ campaign was soon shown to be wanting. 
On the one hand, May struggled to construct a likable public persona. Introverted by 
nature, she seemed robotic and temperamentally unsuited to being the centre of a 
highly personalised campaign. On the other hand, May also struggled to live up to her 
billing. Days after her party’s manifesto launch, the prime minister performed an 
embarrassing U-turn on the issue of funding for domiciliary social care. Doubts about 
the strength and stability of her leadership grew, exacerbated by her refusal to 
participate in a televised leaders’ debate. Terrorist attacks in Manchester and London 
further shifted attention away from Brexit and onto May’s past record as home 
secretary. Labour and Corbyn, meanwhile, had a good campaign. Indeed, Labour’s 
leader came into his own in front of enthusiastic crowds of supporters. Gradually, the 
polls narrowed.  
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In the event, the Conservatives won only 317 seats, 55 more than Labour but 13 fewer 
than in 2015. Even though initial expectations of a Tory landslide had faded, the final 
outcome was still something of a shock. To be sure, the Tories polled 42.4 percent of 
the popular vote, their highest share since 1983 and a significant increase on the 36.9 
percent achieved two years earlier. They also did very well in Scotland, winning no 
fewer than 13 seats. But the fact remains that May lost her parliamentary majority in 
an election that she had called and which had been framed around her abilities as a 
leader. She was able to continue in office at the head of a minority government thanks 
to a confidence-and-supply agreement reached with the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP). She was also able to continue for the good reason that she had made the 
premiership even more of a poisoned chalice than when she had inherited it. Who in 
their right mind would want to usurp her as the head of a divided minority 
government? Even for an ambitious career politician, it was possibly the worst time to 
become prime minister. Crucially, there was no obvious successor around whom her 
divided party could unite. May’s personal authority, however, was left in tatters. She 
was obliged to sack her key advisers, Nick Timothy and Fiona Hill, and she was 
unable to conduct a wide-ranging reshuffle of her government. She had squandered 
most of her ability to provide prime ministerial leadership. 
  
At the time of writing, it would be unwise to make too many predictions about the 
ultimate fate of Britain’s second female prime minister or the final outcome of the 
Brexit negotiations. Much will depend on the durability of the Conservative-DUP 
agreement. Britain still seems destined to leave the EU, but the result of the 2017 
general election has made it more difficult for May to strike a deal that reflects her 
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vision of Brexit. Indeed, it has made it more difficult for her government to strike any 
deal with the EU. Even with the DUP’s backing, May is utterly reliant on the support 
of the most ardent Leavers in her party, some of whom are reluctant to pay a large 
divorce bill to the EU. In the language of Putnam’s (1988) two-level game, the ‘win-
set’ among Tory MPs for a deal is thus very narrow. The result of the 2017 election 
also casts doubts on the feasibility of May’s attempts to reposition her party and take 
it in a more interventionist direction. Lastly, the result casts obvious doubt on the 
viability of May continuing as Conservative leader and prime minister. The 
Westminster consensus is that May is on borrowed time. That may well be the case; 
but as both the Brexit referendum and 2017 general election have taught us, events 




                                                 
1 Although the Conservatives’ 330 MPs (out of 650) suggested an absolute majority of 
only ten, the four Sinn Féin MPs refused to take their seats in the House of Commons, 
and neither the speaker nor his three deputies—one Tory and two Labour MPs—
would be expected to vote. As a result, the government’s majority was 16 in practice. 
2 This proportion refers to the seven out of 27 ministers entitled to attend cabinet. 
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